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 Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.  My name 
is Lisa Heinzerling.  I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University 
Law Center.  I have also been a visiting professor at the Harvard and Yale 
Law Schools.  I am a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, 
where I served as editor-in-chief of the University of Chicago Law Review.  
After law school I clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and then for Justice William Brennan of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  I was an Assistant Attorney General in the 
Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s 
Office for three years before coming to Georgetown in 1993.  My expertise 
is in environmental and administrative law.  I am also the Vice-President of 
the Center for Progressive Regulation. 
 
The Center for Progressive Regulation is a nonprofit research and 
educational organization of university-affiliated academics with expertise in 
the legal, economic, and scientific issues related to regulation of health, 
safety, and the environment. CPR supports regulatory action to                          
protect health, safety, and the environment, and rejects the conservative view 
that government’s only function is to increase the economic efficiency of 
private markets. Through research and commentary, CPR seeks to inform 
policy debates, critique anti-regulatory research, enhance public 




My testimony today concerns H.R. 2432, the “Paperwork and 
Regulatory Improvements Act of 2003.” This bill would require certain 
agencies to develop a “regulatory budget” that would limit the amount 
private parties could be required to spend to comply with federal rules. The 
regulatory budget is a bad idea, in principle and in the form proposed in this 
bill. The regulatory budget contemplated in this bill is a stealth tax cut, 
which would arbitrarily restrict the amount of money businesses must spend 
to limit their pollution and to engage in other activities required by law. 
 
 As I explain in detail below, H.R. 2432’s requirement of a regulatory 
budget suffers from these major flaws: 
 
1. Limiting the amount of money private entities must spend to 
comply with federal regulatory requirements undermines those 
requirements without changing the laws under which the 
requirements arise. The regulatory budget is deregulation in 
disguise. 
 
2. Regulatory budgeting is fundamentally different from the federal 
budgetary process: the federal budget limits the actual 
expenditures federal entities may make, while regulatory 
budgeting rests on mere estimates – which often prove wildly off 
the mark – of private expenditures. 
 
3. Limiting private parties’ regulatory expenditures, without 
consideration of the benefits those expenditures would produce, 
makes no sense. 
 
I. Deregulation in Disguise 
 
  Federal agencies impose requirements on private entities in 
accordance with existing laws, passed by Congress. These laws typically do 
not set a pre-determined limit on – or “budget” for – the expenditures private 
parties must make in order to comply with the law. H.R. 2432, in contrast, 
would impose arbitrary limits on private expenditures by setting such a pre-
determined limit. The “budget” contemplated in this bill would be 
inconsistent with many of the existing legal obligations of private entities. 
Indeed, such a budget could be seen as condoning outright legal violations 
by private entities where compliance with the law would lead to an 
exceedance of the budgetary limit. 
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 Let me provide a concrete example. One of the agencies covered by 
the regulatory budget created by this bill is the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).  A large portion of the environmental progress made by this 
agency has come through requirements for polluting facilities to install state-
of-the-art pollution control technology. The Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and other important 
environmental laws all have such requirements at their cores. One well-
known program of the Clean Air Act, for example, requires major existing 
sources of air pollution to install the best available control technology when 
they undertake major modifications of their facilities.  This is the New 
Source Review program. 
 
 Now suppose that, under section 1120(a) of this bill, the Office of 
Management and Budget, in consultation with the EPA, decided to designate 
New Source Review as one of the programs subject to the new regulatory 
budget. And suppose that they decided that the regulatory budget – the limit 
on the amount private polluters would be required to spend in complying 
with the law – would be, say, $100 million.  It is easy enough to see that this 
limit on private expenditures could well be insufficient to pay for private 
companies’ legal obligations under the law. Yet nothing in H.R. 2432 
prevents OMB and EPA from together limiting private parties’ existing legal 
obligations through the device of the regulatory budget. 
  
 In fact, one might go further and say that the only plausible purpose of 
the regulatory budget is to deregulate, and to do so opaquely so as to avoid 
the political ramifications of reductions in environmental protection and 
other governmental benefits. To see this point, consider the three general 
levels at which the regulatory budget might be set. 
 
First, the regulatory budget for a program might be set at a level that 
exceeds the expenditures that would be expected given current legal 
obligations.  In this case, the regulatory budget would have no effect on 
existing legal arrangements; indeed, there would be no point in a budget that 
had this effect. Second, the budget could be set just at the level expected to 
be spent under existing legal obligations. In this case, too, again, the budget 
would have no operative effect; it would merely reiterate private parties’ 
existing obligations. Third and finally, the regulatory budget could be set at 
a level below the amount that would be spent by private entities under 
existing regulatory requirements. This result is clearly the aim of this bill. 
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Certainly, this approach would give the regulatory budget operative effect 
(unlike the other two approaches just described), but only by lessening 
private parties’ obligations under existing law. The regulatory budget is thus 
deregulation in disguise: its only purpose and effect would be silently to 
relax rules set under other laws. 
 
II. The Regulatory Budget Is Not A Real Budget 
 
 The federal budget places a limit on the actual expenditures the 
federal government may make in a given year.  The budget describes the 
actual financial outlays that will be made. It is fundamentally different from 
the regulatory “budget” contemplated in this bill. 
 
  “Regulatory budgeting” and the “regulatory budget” are not defined 
in H.R. 2432 (part of a pattern of vagueness in this bill).  However, these 
terms are typically used to refer to limits on the amounts private parties can 
be required to spend to comply with regulatory requirements. These limits 
are set in advance of actual expenditures.  The limits are therefore estimates 
of regulatory costs.  They are not, as is the case with the federal budget, 
limits on the amount of money regulated entities will actually spend. 
 This distinction between the federal budget and regulatory budgets is 
of enormous significance. Ex ante estimates of regulatory costs are 
notoriously unreliable. Empirical studies have demonstrated that actual costs 
often end up being far lower than the costs estimated in advance of 
regulation. There are a number of reasons for this pattern, including: cost 
estimates are usually provided by the regulated entities themselves, and 
these entities have an incentive to exaggerate costs to avoid regulation; after 
regulation, technological innovation often produces compliance at a lower 
cost than anticipated; and unanticipated efficiencies associated with 
regulation can achieve compliance at a lower cost.  Whatever the reason, the 
fact remains that regulatory costs estimated in advance of regulation tend to 
be overstated.  Thus regulatory budgets based on such estimates will be 
unreliable predictors of actual costs. Most likely, regulated entities will end 
up spending far less than their “budgeted” amount because the estimates on 
which the budget is based will likely be too high. 
For a comprehensive analysis of these issues, see Thomas O. 
McGarity and Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1997 (2002). 
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III. Ignoring Benefits 
 
 Many federal regulatory programs cost a lot of money but also do a 
lot of good.  The Clean Air Act as a whole, for example, has required large 
regulatory expenditures, but it also produced $22 trillion in net benefits in 
the first 20 years of its operation. (EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean 
Air Act, 1970 to 1990, at ES-8 (Oct. 1997).) It would be foolish to limit the 
amount private parties must spend on controlling, say, air pollution without 
considering the health and environmental benefits that would be lost in 
doing so. The only effect of such a limit would be to enrich corporate 
polluters at the expense of the public. 
 
 Yet this is exactly what H.R. 2432 appears to do. The bill provides no 
guidance for how regulatory budgets are to be set, and certainly does not 
require that budgets be set with careful attention to the benefits that might be 
lost under the regulatory budgets. Indeed, H.R. 2432 appears to contemplate 
that regulatory benefits will be considered only after the regulatory budgets 
are set.  Section 1120(b) of the bill requires the “regulatory budgets” to 
“present, for one or more of the major regulatory programs of the agency, 
the varying levels of costs and benefits to the public that would result from 
different budgeted amounts.” This provision seems to assume that regulatory 
budgets will first be set – according to some mysterious, unnamed criterion – 
and then those already-established budgets will be compared by considering 
the varying cost-benefit profiles of the budgets. 
  
 This approach makes no sense, as it would allow OMB to limit 
expenditures for programs that are highly beneficial. The bill also gives 
completely unfettered discretion to OMB, “in consultation with” the 
agencies, to set these regulatory budgets. OMB should not be entrusted with 
this much power. On other occasions when OMB has taken it upon itself to 
target regulatory programs for reform, it has done so in a patently political 
fashion: recall the regulatory “hit list” OMB infamously developed in its 
2001 report on the costs and benefits of federal regulation. In OMB’s hands, 
the regulatory budget has a very good chance of becoming just another hit 
list favored by private industry. 
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